Delhi High Court: In a petition filed by Desire Infrabuild Pvt Ltd. (petitioner) under Section 29A of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal by a period of 15 months i.e. from 14-01-2024 to 14-04-2025. Jasmeet Singh, J., held that the present Section 29A petition is belated and an attempt to cure an incurable defect. Thus, allowing the present petition would mean permitting the petitioner to not only enjoy the fruits of being a fence sitter but also putting a premium on its inaction, which is not the ambit and scope of Section 29A of the 1996 Act.
The facts, in brief, are that on 03-03-2022 this Court appointed a sole arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties. The pleadings were completed on 15-07-2022, and accordingly the arbitral mandate, under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was set to expire on 14-07-2023. On 18-07-2023, by mutual consent, the parties extended the Tribunal’s mandate by a further six months under Section 29A (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Tribunal reserved the award on 14-11-2023, but the extended mandate expired on 14-01-2024, rendering the Tribunal functus officio. Despite this, the award was rendered on 06-04-2024. On 04-07-2024 the respondent filed a petition under Section 34 challenging the award, and on 12-08-2024 this Court stayed operation of the award. Thereafter, on 27-01-2025, the petitioner instituted the present proceedings under Section 29A seeking extension of the tribunal’s mandate.
The Section 29A petition was moved only after the arbitral award had already been delivered, challenged under Section 34, and stayed by the Court. The petitioner sought to retrospectively extend the tribunal’s mandate so as to validate the award dated 06-04-2024, despite its having been rendered after the mandate had lapsed. The core issue before the Court, therefore, was whether an application for extension of mandate under Section 29A is maintainable once the award has been pronounced and is already the subject of challenge proceedings.
The petitioner contended that Section 29A empowers the Court to extend the mandate even after expiry of the statutory period and placed reliance on Chandok Machineries v. S.N. Sunderson & Co., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11000 where it was held that steps taken by an arbitral tribunal beyond the prescribed time could be validated if the Court later extended the mandate. In contrast, the respondent relied on Powergrid Corporation of India Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8324 which clarified that extension under Section 29A can only be sought while arbitral proceedings are still pending and must necessarily precede the delivery of the award. Supporting this view, the respondent also cited decisions such as Suryadev Alloys & Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Govindaraja Textiles Pvt. Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7858 to emphasize that once an award is delivered and the tribunal becomes functus officio, a retrospective extension of mandate is impermissible.
The Court analyzed Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, noting its design as a strict time-bound framework for rendering awards, twelve months from completion of pleadings, extendable by six months with party consent. Subsection (4) provides that the arbitrator’s mandate automatically terminates if the award is not made within this period, unless the Court grants an extension, and also empowers the Court to reduce fees where delay is attributable to the tribunal. The second proviso to subsection (4) ensures continuity of the mandate while an application under subsection (5) for extension on sufficient cause is pending. Interpreting these provisions together, the Court held that although it has the power to extend time even after expiry, such power is predicated on arbitral proceedings still being alive; the statutory scheme must be construed purposively to uphold expedition in arbitration while permitting limited judicial intervention where necessary.
The Court carefully examined the precedents cited by the parties to determine whether an extension of mandate could be granted after the award had already been delivered. It relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494 which held that an application under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period, provided such an application is pending, in which case the tribunal must refrain from pronouncing the award until the Court decides the extension. Thus, while the Court acknowledged that judicial power exists to extend the mandate post-expiry, it emphasized that this power is conditional upon there being a pending application, which keeps the tribunal’s mandate alive until the Court rules.
In reconciling the authorities, the Court placed reliance on National Skill Development Corporation v. Best First Step Education (P) Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1479 which harmonized Rohan Builders (supra) with Powergrid Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) and Chandok Machineries (supra). The principle distilled was that if a Section 29A(5) application is filed before the award and remains pending, it preserves the tribunal’s authority and the proceedings; conversely, if no application is pending and the award is already delivered, a subsequent petition for extension is not maintainable since the tribunal has already become functus officio. The Court also clarified that Chandok Machineries (supra) was distinguishable because its peculiar facts involved the majority of arbitrators signing the award within the mandate period and only one signing thereafter, and hence it could not be read as a general rule permitting retrospective validation of awards rendered outside the mandate.
The Court reiterated that Section 29A is to be construed purposively to secure the legislative goal of time-bound arbitration while permitting limited judicial extension where necessary. The proviso to Section 29A (4) preserves a Tribunal’s mandate only during the pendency of an extension application, thereby preventing a vacuum. Where no such application exists, and the award is delivered, the Tribunal ceases to have authority, and the defect cannot be retrospectively cured. By referring to the statutory scheme, including consensual extension under subsection (3) and judicial discretion under subsections (4)(5), along with provisions for reducing arbitrators’ fees in case of delay, the Court stated that the law balances expedition, accountability, and finality.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the Arbitral mandate in the present case expired on 14-01-2024, and the award dated 06-04-2024 was thus rendered when the tribunal was already ‘functus officio’. No application under Section 29A(5) had been filed before pronouncement of the award; instead, the petitioner approached the Court only on 27-01-2025, long after the respondent had challenged the award under Section 34 and secured an interim stay. On these facts, the petition was viewed as an attempt to “cure an incurable defect” and to obtain retrospective validation of an invalid award, which would reward delay and “fence-sitting.” The Court therefore held the petition not maintainable and dismissed it.
[Desire Infrabuild Pvt Ltd v. Oyo Apartments Investments LLP, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5929, decided on 18-08-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
Mr. Shikhar Sharma, Mr. Mudit Ruhella, Mr. Aryaman Nehra, Mr. Vishal Tyagi, Advocates for petitioner
Dr. Amit George, Mr. Chaitanya Kaushik, Mr. Avinash K Singh, Mr. Saurabh Pal, Ms. Seema Mehta, Ms. Vidhi Uppal, Mr. Dushyant Kaul, Advocates for respondent
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