Orissa High Court: While considering the present petition filed by teachers of Government and Aided Schools challenging the State authorities’ decision to revoke licenses earlier granted to them for registering Muslim marriages and divorces, and maintaining related official records; a Single Judge Bench of Dixit Krishna Shripad, J., while dismissing the petition, held that the Government had first-hand experience and information as to the functions teachers performed and Muhammedan Registrars accomplished, and in its accumulated wisdom, was of the opinion that teaching would be materially affected if teachers became Muhammedan Registrars.
Background:
The teachers of Government/Aided Schools (petitioners) were granted licenses under the Orissa Muhammedan Marriage and Divorce Registration Act, 1949 (‘1949 Act’) and the Orissa Muhammedan Marriage and Divorce Registration Rules, 1976 (‘1976 Rules’)
The petitioners argued that they had been discharging statutory duties as licensees under the 1949 Act read with the 1976 Rules for years, without compromising their duties as teachers. There was absolutely no complaint from any quarters in general, and from the community of the taught in particular. All of a sudden, the decision was taken based on an erroneous assumption to the contrary. There was absolutely no prohibition either in the 1949 Act or in any other statute, including the Conduct Rules. Therefore, the decision to cut short their rights needed to be voided, coupled with a direction to continue or renew their licenses.
The Opposite Parties vehemently resisted the petitions. They justified the decision, arguing that it was not punitive. They contended that the petitioners, being public servants and civil servants of the State holding the public office of teacher and drawing salary in the prescribed pay scales, should not be burdened with additional responsibilities. They argued that the registration of Muslim marriages and divorces, and the maintenance of official records in that connection, would certainly affect the discharge of their duties as teachers. This, in turn, would adversely impact the interest of pupils. Consequently, they sought dismissal of the writ petitions.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court examined that the 1949 Act was enacted by the State Legislature, providing for the voluntary registration of Muhammedan marriages and divorces. The Court observed that Section 3 of the 1949 Act provided for the grant of a license to any Muslim, authorising him to register Muslim marriages and divorces, and that an application had to be made to him, while the Government had the power to revoke or suspend such license.
The Court highlighted that Section 3 of the 1949 Act had not given any absolute right to obtain a license and become a Muhammedan Registrar. The Court noted that the section had employed the term “It shall be lawful for the State Government to grant a license to any person” and observed that the expression “to any person” was of wider expanse, and the choice lay with the Government. The Court further observed that Rule 3 of the 1976 Rules accorded preference to ex-Kazis, Muslim Government pensioners, Maulavies, Khandkars, and Mullas. Therefore, serving Government servants such as the petitioners could not have claimed a license as a matter of right and the Government had possessed abundant discretion.
The Court emphasised that the petitioners’ long discharge of duties as Muhammedan Registrars had not created any vested right to renewal or extension. The Court noted that a license of this kind did not create any interest in any office, as it was a matter of privilege. The Court observed that the Registrar of Muhammedan marriages and divorces held a public office with attached powers and duties, since Section 25 stated that every Muhammedan Registrar shall be, and be deemed to be, a public servant, and his duties under the Act shall be deemed public duties.
The Court emphasised that several onerous duties were attached to the Office of Muhammedan Registrar, as their functions had far-reaching evidentiary consequences. The Court noted that, at times, they had to travel to other places for duty, since Rule 49 provided for personal appearance with Registers and Records if summoned by Courts. The Court observed that, that being the position, how they would discharge their duty as teachers with absolute commitment in Government Schools was a big question.
The Court highlighted that teaching had been a noble profession, as it was teachers in general, and primary/secondary school teachers in particular, who inculcated civilizational values and culture in young minds. Therefore, the Court noted that ancient scriptures had chanted “Guru Saakshaat Parabrahma,” literally likening the teacher to God, and held that the decision of the Government, regardless of certain arguable defects therein, could not have been faltered.
The Court emphasised that the Government was the appointing authority for the posts of teacher in its schools, but also it was the Government which was empowered to grant license to become Muhammedan Registrars. The Court observed that the Government had first-hand experience and information as to the nature of functions the teachers performed and the Muhammedan Registrars accomplished, and the Government, in its accumulated wisdom, was of the opinion that the performance of teaching would be materially affected if teachers became Muhammedan Registrars.
The Court observed that all the petitioners were admittedly civil servants in permanent employment with settled families, drawing regular salaries in attractive pay scales. The Court emphasised that it was not their case that the income received was insufficient for their livelihood or that they would earn extra income if permitted to function as Muhammadan Registrars.
The Court further held that, on the other side of the spectrum, there were thousands in the Muslim community who were unemployed or underemployed. Such persons could be preferred for the grant of license to function as Muhammadan Registrars of marriage and divorce, so that a penny or two would fall into their pockets on discharge of duties. The Court concluded that such preference would align with the idea of distributive justice as enacted in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution.
The Court, therefore found the petitions devoid of merits and held that they were liable to be dismissed.
[Md. Usman Khan v. State of Orissa, WP(C) No. 17429 of 2025, 08-09-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners: R.C. Jena & M. Padhi, Advocates, B. Bhuyan, Sr. Advocate with Md. Gulam Madani, Advocate, U.C. Mishra, A. Mishra, J.K. Mahapatra, D. Debadarshani & S. Dash, Advocates, P. Pattnaik, K.N. Muduli, D. Sahoo & S.K. Swain, Advocates
For the Opposite Parties: S.K. Jee, Addl. Government Advocate
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