Let Them Be Seen: A Case for Recording Every Advocate’s Presence in the Supreme Court

A troubling shift is underway at India’s highest court: junior advocates and silent contributors are being scrubbed from the record of proceedings (RoP) — not for lack of merit, but for not having the right label or podium time. The Supreme Court (SC) in a recent judgment in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. State of U.P.¹, has introduced a significant procedural shift, wherein it directed that Court Masters shall record appearances in the RoP strictly for those who are physically present and arguing at the time of the hearing. Additionally, it permitted listing only one assisting advocate or Advocates-on-Record (AoR) per arguing counsel.² While this may streamline court records, it also marks a regressive move for inclusive attribution. By tethering recognition solely to podium time, the Court not only narrows the collaborative identity of litigation but also institutionalises erasure of those who meaningfully contribute behind the scenes.

This article argues that the Court’s interpretation of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013³ (SC Rules) is unduly rigid and functionally reductive — one that sidelines junior advocates and misrepresents the intended role of AoR. By confining recognition in the RoP to only those who physically argue, and at most one assisting counsel, the Court has effectively erased a large class of contributors whose intellectual and strategic input remains indispensable to the conduct of cases. More concerningly, the judgment appears to apply the principles of strict interpretation, commonly reserved for criminal and taxation statutes, to procedural rules. Such an approach is inconsistent with established canons of statutory interpretation, which caution against importing rigid interpretive methods into domains meant to facilitate justice rather than restrict it.

The genesis — The spree of the Court’s direction

On 30-12-2022, the SC issued a Notice⁴ (2022 Notice) allowing AoR to mark the appearance of advocates through an online link available on the official website. This practice facilitated broader attribution, including for briefing counsel and juniors who contributed off the record. However, this procedural flexibility was questioned in Baidya Nath Choudhary v. Sree Surendra Kumar Singh⁵, where a Division Bench led by Justice J.K. Maheshwari took judicial notice of the fact that certain advocates, despite neither being physically present in Court nor appearing via videoconferencing, were still registering their names to be recorded in the proceedings. The Bench strongly deprecated this practice, terming it “completely unfair”, especially in cases where the advocate was not even in town.⁶

The SC relying on the 2022 Notice, underscored the onerous responsibility placed on AoR to accurately furnish the names of advocates appearing either physically or online in a given case. The Court deliberately interpreted the Notice to mean that only those advocates who are actually present in Court or assisting the arguing counsel during the hearing should have their presence recorded. This interpretation explicitly precludes any advocate who is neither physically present nor appearing through videoconferencing from marking their presence merely by submitting information online. The Court’s stance thus aims to ensure the integrity of attendance records and curb misuse, but it simultaneously restricts recognition to advocates with active courtroom presence, excluding those who contribute substantially behind the scenes.

In Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P.⁷, a Division Bench headed by Justice Bela Madhurya Trivedi further clarified the scope of the 2022 Notice. The Court held unequivocally that the Notice authorises AoR to mark the appearances only of those advocates who are genuinely appearing in the case, namely, the AoR themselves and the advocates who are scheduled to argue on the particular day of hearing. By implication, the Notice does not permit AoR to mark the presence of advocates who lack authorisation to appear or argue in the case.⁸ This ruling reinforced the principle that recognition in RoP must be limited to those actively engaged in the hearing, further narrowing the scope of who can be officially recorded as appearing before the Court.

While Baidya Nath case⁹ recognised that the 2022 Notice permitted AoR to mark the appearances of advocates either physically present or appearing virtually, the Division Bench in Bhagwan Singh case¹⁰ significantly narrowed this scope. It held that only advocates who are duly authorised to appear and argue on the particular day of hearing may have their appearances recorded. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. case¹¹ it was further a troubling practice was highlighted where multiple advocates were marked as appearing for a party, sometimes running into several pages in RoP, without any verification or certification of their actual presence or authorisation. Justice Bela Madhurya Trivedi’s Bench observed that this widespread practice, whether in simple or complex matters, raised serious concerns about the accuracy and integrity of the official records, underscoring the need for stricter controls on recording appearances.

Who gets to appear? Untangling Rule 1

The legal regime in India primarily recognises three kinds of practicing advocates. Section 16¹² of the Advocates Act, 1961¹³ (Act) categorises advocates into two types — Senior Advocates and advocates’ other than Senior Advocates. The third classification — AoR, is recognised by the SC in SC Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution of India¹⁴. The SC Rules provide, in extenso, the provisions governing the advocates who can argue, address and act before the Supreme Court. The SC Rules explicitly restrict the filing of vakalatnamas i.e. the power of attorney authorising legal representation, solely to AoR. This exclusivity is not without reason.

Rule 1(a) of the SC Rules entitles all advocates whose names are enrolled on the rolls of a State Bar Council (SBC)¹⁵ to appear before the Court. However, this entitlement is not absolute; it is expressly subject to the provisions of the SC Rules. The first proviso imposes a specific restriction on advocates with less than one year of practice, barring them from addressing the Court for the purpose of any effective hearing. Nevertheless, it permits them to mention matters for limited purposes such as seeking dates, adjournments, or similar procedural orders. The underlying intent is to ensure that only advocates with sufficient experience address the Court on substantive issues, given its status as the final appellate forum in the country.

Importantly, the proviso does not prohibit such junior advocates from appearing in Court. “Appearing” in this context must be understood to include assisting a Senior Advocate, an AoR, or any advocate eligible to address the Court. Thus, there is no restriction on junior advocates assisting in proceedings, even if they cannot themselves address the Bench during effective hearings. The corollary, therefore, is that all advocates with more than one year of experience on the SBC roll are not barred from either addressing the Court or mentioning matters.

Further, the second proviso to Rule 1(a) confers a residuary power on the Court to permit any person to appear and address it. Notably, the rule uses the term “person” rather than “advocate”, thereby extending this discretion to include non-advocates, junior advocates and even parties appearing in person. This reinforces the principle that courtroom participation, and indeed recognition, is not intended to be rigidly gatekept but is subject to judicial discretion and broader considerations of justice. A contrary practice, such as excluding juniors from acknowledgement in RoP, cannot be justified under the SC Rules as they stand.

However, in Jitendra v. State (NCT of Delhi)¹⁶, a Bench headed by Justice Abhay Shreeniwas Oka affirmed the constitutional logic behind this rule, observing that the Supreme Court being the final Court in our country, therefore, for this purpose of maintaining the sanctity of this Court and for ensuring that cases are properly conducted, only AoR are entitled to file a case/vakalatnama for a party.¹⁷ This doctrinal gatekeeping underscores the Court’s intent to ensure a standard of accountability and preparedness. Yet, paradoxically, while AoR are recognised as the official face of a case, those who may assist them, junior counsel, briefing advocates, and chamber juniors, often remain invisible in the official RoP, even when they play a pivotal role in the conduct and outcome of litigation.

This brings us to a pressing institutional question: is SC now operating as an “AoR-exclusive club”, where only AoR or designated advocates are permitted to appear, argue and be acknowledged? Historically, AoRs would file the appearance details of the full team — including briefing counsel and juniors — via the Court’s online portal.

The ramifications of the judgment in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case¹⁸ are far-reaching, both in terms of procedural practice and professional equity.

Privileges/entitlement of an Advocate-on-Record

Sub-rule (b) of Rule 1¹⁹ provides for who can appear, plead and address the Court. The sub-rule consists of two parts — first, being negatively worded, states that no advocate other than an AoR for a party shall appear, plead and address the Court. The first part clearly indicates that only an AoR for a party shall appear, plead and address the Court.

However, the first part is connected by way of employing the usage of “subordinate conjunction” — “unless”, which introduces a dependent clause (the second part of the sentence). The subordinating conjunction introduces two conditions, wherein it allows two other types of advocates, other than an AoR, to appear, plead and address the Court. The first condition being — either the advocate is instructed by an AoR or second, the advocate is permitted by the Court — they both can appear, plead and address the Court. In Jitendra case²⁰, the SC recognised that as far as the Court is concerned, an advocate other than an AoR for a party is entitled to appear, plead or address a case only if he is instructed by an AoR.²¹

With respect to the power of the Court to permit, sub-rule (b)²² clarifies the power of the Court as also available in the second proviso of sub-rule (a).²³ While latter allows the Court to permit any person, the former is only concerned with the “advocates”. Another point of differences in these two provisions is that sub-rule (b)²⁴ empowers the Court to permit advocates to appear, plead and address the Court. Power in these two provisions is verbatim the same however, sub-rule (b)²⁵ grants the Court power to permit any advocate to plead before it as well. The only limitation being that the Court cannot permit person other than an advocate to plead before it.

Rule 7²⁶ provides that an AoR, upon filing his memo of appearance and vakalatnama, becomes entitled to act on the behalf of such party. The word “acting” has been defined in the Explanation provided in Rule 2²⁷ as:

(i) “acting” means filing an appearance or any pleadings or applications in any Court or Tribunal in India, or any act (other than pleadings) required or authorised by law to be done by a party in such Court or Tribunal either in person or by his recognised agent or by an advocate or attorney on his behalf.

Therefore, act means to file appearance, pleadings or applications in any Court. It is action done on behalf of the party with respect to filing of an appearance or applications in any court. “Acting” therefore does not include either arguing, appearing or addressing the Court. It is per se an act done outside the Court, mainly dealing with the procedure of filing. “Act” would thus mean filing a written motion while “appearing” would mean speaking on behalf of the party in the Court.

By virtue of Rule 7(a)(i)²⁸, an AoR therefore, once he files memo of appearance along with vakalatnama, he becomes entitled to act as well as plead for the party. The AoR also becomes entitled to conduct and prosecute before the Court all the proceedings that may be taken up in respect of the said matter.

Rule 20²⁹ recognises the principle of agency and provides an AoR to authorise another AoR to act for him in any case. The intent behind this Rule is twofold — one, it admits that AoRs who have been duly authorised by the party may not, due to unavoidable reasons, attend to a specific case hence, they are competent to authorise another AoR to act on their behalf. Second, considering the prestige of the institution of an AoR, it attaches duty onto them that authorisation among themselves, in the absence of the parties’ consent, is not taken lightly and therefore, done with due diligence and carefully. In fact, Rule 20³⁰ reiterates the principle incorporated in Rule 7(a)(i)³¹ that entitles the AoR to conduct and prosecute all the proceedings.

Understanding the undefined terms

Order IV³² has been drafted meticulously and the words used therein have been crafted defining powers of both the Court as well as the advocates.

(i) Rights of AoR and other advocates

SC Rules grant an AOR with more power and responsibility vis-à-vis the other class of advocates. The following table enumerates the entitlement —

While only AoRs can “act” (i.e. file documents) both AoR and permitted advocates can “appear” and “address” the Court. This distinction is foundational — and Supreme Court Bar Assn. judgment³³ blurs it dangerously. While Rule 7(a)(i)³⁴ provides that AoRs are entitled to conduct and prosecute all the proceedings before the Court however, it does not encompass that AoRs in that sense can authorise “acting” on behalf of the party onto any other advocate. In view of Rule 20³⁵ the power to conduct and prosecute has been circumscribed stating that an AoR can only authorise another AoR to “act” for him in any case.

Therefore, it becomes absolutely clear that filing of appearance, pleadings or applications in the Court is done only by a class of advocates known as “AoR”. The delegation of this power is envisaged only onto another AoR, in order to protect dignity of the institution as well as make them directly answerable to the Court if in case any mischief is done.

(ii) Difference between “to file an appearance” and “to appear”

Rule 7(c)³⁶ provides that only an AoR is entitled file an appearance for a party in the Court. However, the word “appearance” is not couched by any prefix in order to limit its scope i.e. the provision does not provide that the AoR will file only his appearance. To interpret the provision in this fashion will unnecessarily limit the meaning of the words in which they are used.

Rule 7(a)(i)³⁷ provides that an AoR is entitled to conduct and prosecute all the proceedings for the Court that may be taken in respect of the said matter. In ordinary meaning of these terms, it is clear that the SC Rules empower the AoRs to undertake exercises that are necessary to both conduct and prosecute all the proceedings that may be taken in respect of the said matter — which includes drafting of the case, researching strategy and ultimately arguing it before the Court.

Rule 23³⁸ provides recognition to partnership stating that two or more advocates, who are neither senior advocates nor AoR, they may enter into a partnership whereby any one of them may appear in any cause/matter before the Court. The said provision is clarificatory in nature to Rule 1(b)³⁹.

(Mis)-directions issued in Supreme Court Bar Assn. judgment

In Supreme Court Bar Assn. case⁴⁰, the Court concluded by placing reliance upon the “note” mentioned at the foot of Form 30 in Fourth Schedule⁴¹ of the SC Rules, that the Court Master is required to record appearances in RoP only of: (i) Senior Advocate or AoR or advocate who is physically present and arguing in the Court on behalf of a party at the time of hearing of the matter; and (ii) one advocate or AoR each for assistance in the Court to such arguing Senior Advocate or AoR or advocate as the case may be. Therefore, along with the arguing Senior Advocate or AoR or advocate appearing for a party, further additional appearance of only one advocate or AoR as the case may be, who is assisting in the matter, could be recorded.⁴²

The Court rejected the submissions advanced from the side of the petitioners that it has been the practice in the SC to get appearances of all counsels marked, who are present in the court for a particular case, and contributed or assisted the arguing counsel and stated that no practice could be permitted to overrule the Statutory Rules, particularly when the Rules are framed by SC in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Court has cautioned that the said SC Rules having a statutory force have to be strictly adhered to and followed by all concerned, that is, by the officers of the Court including the Court Masters as also the advocates. Casual, formal or ineffective presence in the Court along with the AoR or arguing advocate, without due authorisation by the party concerned, cannot entitle the advocate to insist the Court Master to record his or her appearance in RoP.⁴³

Misreading the Rules: The Court’s overreach

In Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India⁴⁴, the SC reaffirmed the well-established principle that courts are not empowered to read into a statutory provision conditions or limitations that do not find expression in its plain and unambiguous language. A statute, being the formal expression of legislative will, must be construed primarily through the text employed. The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, which is to be gathered from the words used in the statute, requiring equal attention to what has been expressly stated and to what has been consciously omitted. It is, therefore, contrary to established rules of construction to import words into a statute unless such a course is warranted by compelling necessity within the four corners of the enactment.⁴⁵

Similarly in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama⁴⁶, the SC relying on established English authorities, observed that while the text of the enactment remains central, it must not be treated merely as a syntactic exercise. A statute is neither a literary text nor a theological manuscript; rather, it is an instrument of governance and must be construed with an awareness of its purpose. As Justice Holmes cautioned, “words are not crystals, transparent and unchanged”, and Justice Learned Hand aptly observed that statutes should not be interpreted “as theorems of Euclid”, but with sensitivity to the legislative purpose underlying them.⁴⁷

Further, the SC in Sangeeta Singh case⁴⁸ invoked the “golden rule” of interpretation, as articulated in Grey v. Pearson⁴⁹, holding that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words must prevail, unless such an interpretation leads to absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency with the remainder of the instrument, in which case the language may be modified only to the extent necessary to avoid such consequences.⁵⁰

In light of the above principles, it is respectfully submitted that the directions issued by Justice Bela M. Trivedi’s Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case⁵¹ adopt an excessively literal and narrow construction of SC Rules, thereby imposing an unwarranted burden upon AoR. The judgment fails to capture the broader purpose and underlying spirit of the procedural framework, namely, the facilitation, not restriction, of access to justice and orderly court management. By adopting a hyper-formalistic approach to the recording of appearances in the RoP, the judgment risks marginalising the valuable but often unrecognised contributions of junior advocates and support counsel, and may inadvertently undermine the collaborative nature of legal practice before the SC.

Conclusion: if the law must be interpreted, let it be done with vision — not with blinkers

While the SC’s judgment in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case⁵² seeks to instil greater discipline and authenticity in recording appearances, it regrettably does so by adopting an overly rigid and restrictive interpretation of the SC Rules. This strict construction not only ignores the carefully calibrated distinctions between terms like “act”, “appear”, “plead” and “address”, but also undermines the very framework that empowers AoR and practising advocates to facilitate proceedings effectively.

By conflating “filing an appearance” with “appearing” or “arguing”, SC disrupts established practice, disregards the broader legislative intent, and places an unmerited burden on AoR. Secondly, it sidelines junior advocates and other supporting counsels who play a vital, if often invisible, role in courtroom advocacy, thereby stunting professional growth opportunities at the very Supreme Court of the country. Lastly, by narrowly interpreting the term “arguing” SC has unfairly interfered with the regulation of the number of advocates whose attendance can be marked, which power has been bestowed by the SC Rules on the AoR⁵³ themselves — Supreme Court Bar Assn. judgment⁵⁴ hampers the future prospects of junior associates and other actors playing part behind the curtains by depriving them of getting their name listed on RoP of the particular case before the SC.

By carefully employing these words, the SC Rules differentiate the scope of each and every power and the manner in which it can be exercise in the Court. From our discussion above, it is clear that “to file an appearance” is different than “to appear”. While the latter is an act of appearing before the Court in order to plead and address it, it is in the nature of making necessary submissions before the Court. However, “to file an appearance” means an act of sharing the appearance slip with the Court clerks stating who all appeared in the matter. By virtue of Rule 7(c)⁵⁵ this power is exclusively vested with the AoR, who alone can file an appearance. To interpret Rule 7(c)⁵⁶ to mean that only appearance of an AoR can be recorded in the order-sheet will defeat the specific provision of Rule 1(b)⁵⁷ that allows advocates other than AoR to appear and address the court and Rule 2(b)(ii)⁵⁸ that allows Senior Advocates to appear with an AoR in the Court.

By specifically empowering the AoR to file the appearance, the SC Rules cast duty upon the AoR to diligently conduct and prosecute the proceedings before the Court, of which marking attendance is one of the facets. The judgment Supreme Court Bar Assn. case⁵⁹ therefore, not only unreasonably restricts the scope of Order IV⁶⁰ but is complete disregard of the settled position of law with respect to the rules of interpretation. From our discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, we conclude that the directions issued in Supreme Court Bar Assn. case⁶¹ are unreasonable, unjust and based upon incorrect reading of the statute. Given their overreach, the onerous directions of the judgment stand on borrowed time, the only unresolved issue is the moment of judicial course correction. However, the silver lining in these turbulent times for junior advocates and associates is that the SC has vide Notice dated 15-4-2025 has informed that certain amendments are under consideration and has thus, invited suggestions from the stakeholders.

Rules are meant to guide, not to gatekeep. In its zeal for procedural purity, Supreme Court Bar Assn. case⁶² risks institutional opacity and erases the very hands that make justice possible. If the law must be interpreted, let it be done with vision — not with blinkers. In sum, the judgment’s overreach disturbs the delicate procedural balance and risks ossifying a dynamic practice into a rigid formality. However, there remains hope that the SC’s recent Notice⁶³ dated 15-4-2025, inviting suggestions for amendments to the SC Rules, opens a window for much-needed course correction. It is an opportunity to recalibrate the system toward fairness, flexibility and inclusivity — values that should be at the heart of justice at the highest court.